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Liberty

NOT THE DAUGHTER BUT THE MOTHER OF ORDER — PROUDHON

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"For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!
Shines that high light whereby the world is saved;
And though thou slay us, we will trust in thee."
JOHN HAY.

On Picket Duty.

Nordau's "Paradoxes," another heretical and "degenerate" book, is now announced by a London publisher. It is spoken of as a new work, and will probably be new to Nordau's Philistine admirers. Several years ago a translation of it appeared on this side of the water, and Liberty approvingly quoted some bright passages from its pages. What an audacious fakir Nordau is, and how dense is the stupidity of the "reading public" and the journeymen critics!

Liberty pays considerable attention to Traubel, his "Conservator," and his contributors. I like Traubel, and I like his "Conservator." Both are hopelessly illogical, wayward, and uncertain, however, and criticism of them is scarcely avoidable. Traubel, as a rule, does not attempt to meet his critics; he manifestly endorses the view of John Burroughs (which he reproduces in italics) that the best writings "are not addressed to the critical judgment, but to the life, the soul," whatever that means. The trouble, however, is that the critical judgment, not being lulled or hypnotized, persists in putting two and two together and studying the results.

Dr. Isaac Hull Platt argues in the "Conservator" that evil is just as necessary as good, that good is reached only through evil, and that, since the universe is inherently good, not only is murder in the abstract justified, but even concrete individual murderers are necessarily justified. Then Dr. Platt goes on to declare that nothing in his belief touching the necessity of evil has any "bearing upon the question of either individual or State to resist invasion"! No bearing! Have words, then, no meaning? Invasion is manifestly used as synonymous with evil, and evil is said to be just as necessary as good; yet we are to continue to resist evil! It seems that it is wise for us to resist that which is necessary and justified! Really, Dr. Platt ought to have more consideration for poor human reason. If there is any meaning in his phrases, he ought to help us to grasp it.

Mrs. E. Lynn Linton has an admirable article in the "National Review" on the impertinence and silliness of Christian missions in "heathen" lands. She uses refreshingly plain language with reference to the waste of millions on useless Quixotic crusades in distant countries to the neglect of the outcasts and homeless wanderers at home. She has no patience with the glorification of missionaries as exceptional men and women with enthusiasm for God's work and contempt for worldly pleasures, but is inclined to regard them as ordinary mortals governed by ordinary necessities and desires. The love of adventure, the need of cash, thoughtlessness, and similar motives have their influence in the making of missionaries. This does not mean that missionaries are necessarily worse than others, but it is well to impress upon people the prosaic truth that missionaries are not better than others.

Our virtuous editors are showering praise on the governor of Texas for his theatrical efforts to prevent the Corbett-Fitzsimmons prize fight, which it was proposed to hold in that State. First he roared about enforcing the law against fighting; then, having found that the law was in a hopelessly muddled state, he thundered about the original common law; but he was deprived of that weapon by judicial decisions, and seemed doomed to see the State disgraced and degraded. As a last resort he called a special session of the legislature to pass a new law against prize fighting. The people of Texas are far less moral than their governor, and are understood to have favored the holding of the exhibition, but the governor was bound to protect them against themselves. The hypocritical press is at a loss to find terms emphatic enough to express its admiration for the pious governor; only a few papers, including the New York "Herald," have ventured to question the genuineness and value of this zeal and fervor. What a nation of cheap moralists and canting hypocrites this is!

Grant Allen is certainly frank with his readers. He writes stuff, for revenue only, and also things which he is willing to be judged by as artist and thinker. To enable the reader to distinguish between Allen-Jekyll and Allen-Hyde, our friend has devised an original trademark. "I propose," he says in a published letter, "in future to add the words 'A Hill-Top Novel' to each one of my stories which I write of my own accord, simply and solely for the sake of embodying force of my own opinion. Whenever, therefore, in future the words, 'A Hill-Top Novel,' appear on the title page of a book by me, the reader who cares for truth and righteousness may take it for granted that the book represents my own original thinking." Mr. Allen is shortly to publish a new story which will "raise a protest in behalf of purity." Since there are many others who, like Mr. Allen, are condemned to write more stuff than sense, would it not be a good idea if all should be as frank with the readers as he? Such a course, it is to be feared, would greatly reduce the demand for the hill-top class of productions, for the average reader buys a meritorious book only by accident and through ignorance; but, then, the ordinary course, it must be remembered, is not altogether free from danger. One good book unwittingly bought and read by the average reader may effectually kill an author's reputation, for he is likely to fall under the suspicion of having become a bore or a crank.

Well may the "Sun" say that, to the Philistine who reads the accounts of the lively discussion, before the British Association, of the relation between so-called Christian civilization and the inferior races, it must seem that "the foundations of law, religion, and morality, as taught to him," are "crumbling." Every one who took part in that interesting discussion was a distinguished investigator or experienced traveller, and all agreed that not only are missions a failure, delusion, and snare, but that nearly all the more general efforts to impose our civilization on the inferior races have the most fatal effects on the latter and lead directly to their extinction. One speaker ridiculed our blind worship of the "three R's," and pointed out that other races have got along beautifully without them. Another contemptuously referred to the tendency of the average missionary and civilizer to confound clothes with morality, and asked pious Englishmen to be less hypocritical and abandon the pretence of promoting religion when their real purpose was the extension of the market for cotton goods. A third wondered at the impudence of people who dictate to natives generally more temperate than themselves what they shall eat and drink, and exposed the ignorance of those who assume that all institutions and habits which do not resemble those of "civilization" are necessarily indecent and vicious. There was, in a word, general concurrence in the view expressed by Professor Petrie that scarcely a single race can bear the burden of our so-called Christian civilization, and that there is nothing mysterious about the decay of savages before white men. It is natural that these heretical views should have aroused the resentment of the missionaries and their supporters, but the more independent newspapers have applauded the sentiments expressed in this discussion. How pleased Spencer must be to find that the views he has so persistently upheld are at last coming to be appreciated and boldly presented to the public by men commanding general respect even in Philistia!

Liberty.

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"In abolishing rent and interest, the last vestiges of old-time slavery, the Revolution abolishes at one stroke the sword of the executioner, the seal of the magistrate, the club of the policeman, the gauge of the assessman, the erasing-knife of the department clerk, all those insignia of Politics, which young Liberty grinds beneath her heel." — PROUDHON.

☞ The appearance in the editorial column of articles over other signatures than the editor's initial indicates that the editor approves their central purpose and general tenor, though he does not hold himself responsible for every phrase or word. But the appearance in other parts of the paper of articles by the same or other writers by no means indicates that he disapproves them in any respect, such disposition of them being governed largely by motives of convenience.

An Explanation.

A difficulty that has long been encountered in the conduct of Liberty is that of prompt attention to the correspondence to which its publication gives rise. During the earlier years of its life I was able to cope with this difficulty, but, as the constituency grew, it became impossible for me to attend in a satisfactory manner to the letters and orders that reach this office. My most immediately imperative tasks are those by which I earn my living, and these occupy more than the ordinary working day. Hence even the editorial work upon Liberty and the supervision of its mechanical department, both of which are absolutely necessary if the paper is to appear, can be done by me only in those odd moments which I may find outside the hours devoted to my regular work and to necessary rest and recreation. Important as the correspondence is, it is the one thing that can be put off, and consequently it is put off. Unanswered letters accumulate, and even business orders are neglected for weeks,—sometimes for months.

Such delay is much to be regretted. It is very annoying to all; it naturally excites suspicion in the minds of those who do not know me; and in various ways it hinders the growth of the paper's influence. The patience and consideration that most of the comrades have shown under these trying circumstances are phenomenal, and most warmly do I thank them. But I feel that I should not further tax their tolerant disposition without some general explanation such as that which I now render.

There seems to be no hope of overcoming this difficulty in the near future. The paper, which is largely supported by the aid of its ardent friends, is published very economically, and the employment of a clerk and the rent of extra office-room would add to the regular expenses in a degree unwarrantable. Of course a paper whose aim was profit could not hope to achieve its aim under such circumstances, and would have to give up the ghost. But a paper whose aim is purely educational must pursue its work of education in whatever way it can, unsatisfactory though it may be.

I wish then to apologetically announce to my correspondents that I shall always do my best to attend to them punctually, and that each and all will finally hear from me, provided their letters require action or answer. Meanwhile I ask them to remember that it is just as impossible for me to answer a letter of inquiry regarding a neglected letter as to answer the neglected letter itself. But, to relieve the anxieties of those who have remitted sums of money in advance payment for literature ordered, or for other purposes except subscriptions to the paper, I will undertake to return such sums *immediately* on receiving a demand therefor. Hereafter, then, any letter demanding the return of sums sent as above specified, or insisting that I either fill the order at once or return the money, will be given precedence over other correspondence; the order will not be filled, but the money will be promptly returned.

T.

Political and Other Tyranny.

Ruskin, in "Fors," complains somewhere of the tendency of people to argue with him and challenge his most fundamental postulates. They fancy, he says in substance, that I am in the habit of setting down the first thing that comes into my head, and that, therefore, I may be easily made to see my error and to repent of what I have said. Unlike Ruskin's annoying correspondents, I am always inclined to give a writer the benefit of the doubt, and assume that he not only means what he says, but that he gives us the fruit of due deliberation and mature judgment, and it is with some reluctance that I venture to avow my suspicion that Mr. Traubel, in the last "Conservator," printed some paragraphs embodying, not reasoned-out conclusions, but "the first thing that came into his head" on the subject involved. I refer to the notes on tyranny in general and the distinctions between political and other tyrannies. To me (and I do *not* here set down the first thing that comes into my head) they are so fallacious and self-contradictory that I cannot refrain from attempting to make Mr. Traubel repent of what he has said. Let me quote the paragraphs:

> All around us are leaders, authorities, tyrants, not governmental, the most subtle, the most dangerous, the most inexorable in their demands, and the most unforgiving and relentless in their persecutions. While you are in the courts defending yourself against some trivial invasion, there may be that in your conscience, the issue of theological or social antecedents, compelling you to most unworthy, however unconscious, persecutions. You, fighting persecution, persecute. I submit a case like that of the removal of Professor Bemis from his chair in Chicago University for simple freedom of speech in social questions, and I say that such an exercise of power is far more grave in its offensiveness and in its results than a thousand and one infractions that occur under the club of political majorities.
>
> If we guarded well the passes of private freedom, the by-ways of social and religious emancipation, the political forces as an immediate sequence would vanish for want of sustentation. Political tyranny is birthed in social intolerance. The passive policy of Tolstoi, as against political restriction, is far more potential for progress than physical revolution or heated verbal controversies.

It is, of course, perfectly true that there are tyrannies all around us, religious and social as well as political; but, if I understand Mr. Traubel, he lays down, in the above utterance, three distinct and definite propositions: first, that the religious and social tyranny which is not backed by brute force is "graver" in offensiveness and results than political or governmental tyranny; second, that the latter "is birthed in" (or caused by) the former; third, that, with regard to resistance to *political* tyranny, the passive policy, or non-resistance, is far more potent than the more popular forms of resistance. None of these propositions is true, and I am at a loss to understand where Mr. Traubel finds any evidence in support of them.

Why is religious or social tyranny more dangerous than political tyranny? So far as the individual is concerned, it is clearly far less dangerous. How can religious tyranny manifest itself? In boycotting, in abusive epithets, in ridicule. But political tyranny has all of these channels and the additional one of direct physical coercion. I cannot be imprisoned by those who object to my irreligious views or to my manners and dress, while any departure from the rule laid down by the political majority subjects me to violence and loss of liberty. In my religious and social controversies with the crowd, I can, if I choose, reason with them or treat them with contempt. The weapons of abuse and ridicule are at my disposal as well as at theirs. If there are third parties present that seem amenable to reason, I can present my side of the case to them with the fullest freedom and have some hope of winning them over. Not so in political "controversies." Every defensive weapon is taken away from me, and I am brutally silenced and gagged Which tyranny, in the name of common sense, is more grave and dangerous to me?

Will it be said that political tyranny is less dangerous to society at large? But nothing can be bad for society which is good for each social unit. If the individual's development and life are hampered less by religious and social tyranny than by political, then it obviously follows that social progress is more menaced by the *clubs* of majorities than by the howls and gnashing of teeth.

Take Mr. Traubel's concrete case of Professor Bemis. Would not the offensiveness and the result of the persecution be graver if the professor were sent to prison for his heretical teaching? Assuming that he is monopoly's victim, has he not been greatly benefited by the sympathy of the press and public, the opportunity to expose the motives of his persecutors, and the liberty to seek and obtain other employment? Has not society been benefited by all this? To ask these questions is to answer them.

Mr. Traubel's second proposition is that between "social intolerance" and political tyranny there is the relation of cause and effect. This is true neither historically or statically. Originally all tyranny was political; that is to say, the individual was coerced into religious and social conformity as well as into what we now call political conformity by the same despotism and by the same means. In religion and social relations we have secured some freedom, but in political relations the despotism of the majority has supplanted that of kings without much improvement for the individual. The assumed right of a majority to regulate

economic affairs has no connection with any social intolerance; it is a purely political superstition, based chiefly on imaginary requirements of order and security. It may be said, with far more reason, that such social and religious intolerance as still survives is a relic of the time when political tyranny was all-inclusive and allowed no individual deviation whatever, in any direction, from the course of the dominant elements of the community.

The third proposition is that the non-resistance policy of Tolstoi is more potential for progress than violence or heated theoretical assaults on political tyranny. There are several objections to this doctrine. In the first place, Tolstoi is not passive in Mr. Traubel's sense, for he indulges in heated verbal controversies with the State as freely and persistently as with the church and society. In the second place, if the best way to fight political tyranny is to say nothing about it, why is not the same method equally efficacious against social and religious tyranny? Mr. Traubel certainly implies that the passive policy is not adapted for successful opposition to any other than political tyranny, and yet no reason is hinted at to justify the discrimination. It is difficult to see why heated verbal controversies are proper and fruitful in the religious and social realm and futile or mischievous in the political. Mr. Traubel himself is as ready to attack the State and the political club as the tyranny of church and society, and, if his controversies are never "heated," it is purely because his temperament and philosophy dictate moderation and leniency in all things. Like all generous and charitable teachers, he denounces sin in a manner which is calculated to make the sinner well-pleased and thoroughly reconciled with himself. "Yes," the sinner says to himself, after perusing an eloquent Traubelian tirade against sin, "I am a sinner, but, after all, there is a deal of good in me, and only the unphilosophical will be hard on me. Generous apostles of virtue do not scorn me, but pity me as more of a victim than an offender, if they do not actually find me a necessary factor in the larger movements of progress. Ah, yes, this is a strange world, and there are more things under the sky than are dreamed of by the narrow critics. A fine fellow, Traubel! It is a pleasure to read his 'Conservator.' He helps me to understand myself; without his sympathy I might actually come to look upon myself as a wretch." V. Y.

Defence of Whom and by Whom?

Mr. Byington's article on "The Defensive Contract," printed on another page, seems to me easily the most thoughtful contribution to the discussion of the status of the child that has yet come from the opponents of my view. It will be my aim here to give it the careful consideration it deserves. To his opening paragraph, written to summarize my position, I take no exception, barring an implication carried by the language which he uses under (4). From Mr. Byington's words the reader might infer that I contemplate the necessity or probability of having to choose between the sympathetic and unsympathetic as members of the defensive association. I contemplate nothing of the kind. One of my reasons for favoring such a basis for the defensive association as I have previously outlined is that it is the only basis sure to secure the ultimate adhesion of all or nearly all individuals, whether sympathetic or not. I do not deny, of course, that there would be at first a tendency among those of the sympathetic who should fail to see at once the advantage of the proposed basis to form themselves into innumerable cliques for purposes, not defensive simply, but more or less offensive as well. But this condition of things would have a most powerful influence, through its own impotence and impracticability, in demonstrating the superiority of a purely defensive combination, formed on lines that would make it as simple as possible in its purpose and as inclusive as possible in its conditions of membership, to other combinations characterized by complexity and exclusiveness; and, by the very necessities of the case, all persons would sooner or later perceive the desirability of uniting in one association to secure the single thing which all agree in wanting,—self-liberty,—and of trusting to other than force agencies for the realization of those things which are desired only by single individuals or special classes.

If I correctly diagnose Mr. Byington's case, his failure to appreciate this fact arises from a peculiarity of view which no Anarchist of my acquaintance shares with him. He is a man who has reasoned himself out of his element. Mentally he is in the forefront of radicalism political and economic, but temperamentally he is still strongly tinctured with the narrow prejudices with which he was saturated in his boyhood. He has perceived the folly of forcing by invasive methods one class of the community to regulate their lives in conformity to the views of another class, but in his heart he remains a puritan, and has all the puritan's zeal for making other people as puritanical as himself. An index to his general make-up is seen in the fact that, though a sincere Single Taxer, he thinks he has done better work when he has made one Christian missionary to the heathen than when he has made a dozen Single Taxers (in which I agree with him to the extent of thinking that he has thereby done less harm); and observation of his writings leads me to believe that one of the main reasons why he is in love with Anarchism is to be found in his confidence that in an Anarchistic society Christian missionaries and others of that ilk, having to abandon invasion, will in consequence the more quickly achieve their puritanical aims by concentrating their energies upon what he deems the more effective plan of *compulsion by non-invasive methods*. If I understand him, he is anticipating an onslaught by boycott upon saloon-keepers, Sabbath-breakers, and everybody and everything that is profane. He values Anarchism as a means of providing a field for a conflict of ostracisms, and to him Anarchistic society presents the attractive aspect of a gigantic Donnybrook fair in which the boycott will replace the shillelah. In this universal shindy he means to do his share of head-breaking. Now, such a man, though he may be an Anarchist in reason, and as such of great value to the cause (as Mr. Byington unquestionably is), is not an Anarchist in heart, soul, and spirit. The Anarchist in spirit, in all effort except that of defence against invasion (and even in that as far as possible), desires to convince, not to compel. To him the boycott is only less objectionable than the ballot, the billy, and the bullet, and, while he will not deny to Mr. Byington or to any one else the liberty to use the boycott as freely as he chooses, he intends to use it himself only in the most sparing manner, in cases of great urgency or gravity. The separation of society into petty cliques which "do not speak as they pass by" is to him a thing abhorrent. But, the reader may ask, what has all this to do with the subject under consideration? Much, good reader. I am not forgetting myself. I have written this long paragraph to lead up to the conclusion that the sectarianism which Mr. Byington favors in the defensive sphere is but one manifestation of that general conflict of cliques which he contemplates in many fields of effort. This I find to be the explanation of the fact that he is averse to a social union of all classes in which both the sympathetic and the unsympathetic agree to live non-invasively in order to secure self-liberty, preferring instead a sectarian union of the good against the wicked, by which the latter are to be summarily crushed. These two forms of union differ precisely as the narrow, hard, and arbitrary self-righteousness of the puritan differs from the broad, cheerful, and tolerant self-assertion of the Egoist.

In saying this I do not wish to be understood as casting unpleasant personal reflections upon Mr. Byington. I have an immense respect for him, and should be sorry to have him take these remarks amiss. I say of him only what I would say of myself as I was in those boyhood days when I too was something of a puritan, and no more than Ruskin in his riper age says of himself as he was before he had outgrown the narrow limits of Evangelical Protestantism. And I say it only for the purpose of the argument.

After this general introduction I may now proceed to examine in detail Mr. Byington's criticisms.

(1) The considerations advanced above are a quite sufficient answer to the question why we should make self-liberty the supreme consideration in combining for defence. I followed, too, the same line of reasoning in my answer to Mr. Badcock in No. 323. There I indicated that, if all persons, in combining for coercive purposes, were to follow their sympathies, the coercive associations would be as numerous and various as the sympathies, resulting not only in tyranny, but in a perpetual conflict of tyrannies. The peaceful pursuit of happiness, which is the common object of all, would be impossible under such circumstances. For this reason it is necessary to seek satisfaction for our sympathies solely in the voluntary, non-coercive realm, and get that freedom under which alone such voluntary sympathetic effort can be powerfully effective by confining coercive combination to the securing of self-liberty. And this would still be advisable even if the entire sympathetic class were aware of the advantages of equal liberty, for a union of the sympathetic against unsympathetic invaders would still involve the preservation of order (or an apology for order) by continual suppression and struggle, which is much less desirable, and much less advantageous even to the sympathetic themselves,

than the reduction of suppression and struggle to a minimum by such a form of defensive association as will tend to enlist all classes in its membership by appealing to the one motive—desire for self-liberty—that is common to them all.

(3) In supposing that in such an association there would be two parties pursuing incompatible policies, Mr. Byington forgets that by the hypothesis those who otherwise would prefer a policy making the sympathies paramount will learn, either through reason or experiment, that such a policy is ineffective and impracticable, and will conclude therefore to abandon it so far as force agencies are concerned, and unite for defence with those whose policy makes self-liberty paramount. Mr. Byington will hardly claim that sympathetic persons who have found exclusive association a failure will then join the inclusive association for the purpose of working within it to turn it into an exclusive association and thereby come to grief again. They will join it only because convinced of the necessity of its policy, and thereafter it will be their aim, not to defeat this policy, but to further it. Where, then, will be the warring parties?

That is a queer argument which maintains that an association for defence is weakened by extending its benefits to those who are most commonly attacked. The strength of an association seems to me proportionate to its success in accomplishing its object. Now, an association formed for the prevention of crime certainly would not best succeed in its object by leaving crime alone precisely where it is most rampant. Mr. Byington might as well say that that is the strongest army which never fights. It may be true, but only till the time when the other army gets a whack at it.

I do not agree that men with criminal propensities would be less harmful as outsiders than as members. On the contrary, I think that the surest way to make a man a desperate criminal is to treat him as an outlaw, and that willingness to contract with possible offenders has a tendency to disarm them. In positing this as the rule, of course I do not deny that there are exceptions. But it is the rule, and not the exceptions, that must govern our course. And I make the same answer regarding persons who might attempt to thwart the purpose of the association. As outlaws they would be even more dangerous.

It does not follow that an association would be stronger through exclusion of those who cannot help in the common defence. Such persons, if able to contract, can at least agree to refrain from criminal conduct, and this in itself would strengthen the association. Mr. Byington answers that in the case of a physical cripple the association is as strong without his contract, because it is not in his power to interfere. Again I disagree. There are numerous ways in which a cripple can act criminally,—that is, invasively.

(4) Under this head Mr. Byington does little more than reiterate considerations which I have answered above.

(5) Here we get a very clear illustration of the one-sided view taken by all the opponents of property in babies. It does not seem to have occurred to them that one may desire to be the owner of a baby, as one often desires to own other objects, not for the purpose of abusing it, but for the express purpose of treating it well and protecting it from ill-treatment by others. Mr. Byington tells us that we shall not attract many people to membership by making babies property, because it is only brutal mothers who care to have the liberty to abuse babies. Now, suppose we were discussing the question of property, not in babies, but in pictures, and some one should say: "Oh, you will not gain the adhesion of many by making pictures property, for there are very few who desire the liberty to abuse pictures." I am perfectly sure that Mr. Byington would look upon the inventor of such an argument as a most surprising ninny. I shall be less likely to take a similar view of Mr. Byington after he has pointed out to me the difference between this argument and his own.

My view here is quite the opposite of Mr. Byington's. I have an idea that, when property in babies shall prevail, the brutal mothers will be the very ones to place little or no value on their baby property, and will be rather glad than otherwise to transfer it to sympathetic persons, whereas affectionate mothers will treasure their baby property beyond any other portion of their estate, and jealously resent any interference with it. I was talking on this subject the other day with a well-known Anarchist, who is himself the gentlest of fathers to a family of beautiful children and in all ways one of the most deeply sympathetic of men, and he called my attention to the fact that the affection of a mother for her baby is largely dependent upon the baby's helplessness, upon her feeling that the infant is fully in her control, her own to do with as she will; that, as the baby develops out of the helpless stage, the purely maternal love gradually changes into an affection of another sort, becoming rather that of a comrade or a friend; and that to lessen this power of absolute control over the infant child would be a blow at motherhood. I consider this an important truth. It is a truth which is appreciated already by not a few mothers,—women of the highest development And I am confident that nearly all affectionate mothers will appreciate it and insist upon it, once they are rid of the superstition that there is something sacred about human beings, as such, that exempts them from the domain of property. There is really no reason in denying property in human beings because of their humanity. One may as legitimately own beings with two legs and no feathers as any other species of animal. But there is sound reason in denying property in all beings constitutionally capable of dealing with us on an equal footing. If there were any such beings among brutes, it would be necessary to exempt them from the domain of property. And, conversely, such human beings as do not meet this requirement cannot properly be so exempted. As a matter of fact, these two classes, human beings and beings capable of contracting, are nearly coextensive, the latter including the former with the exception of very young children and weak-minded adults; and this has led us to identify the two, substituting in our minds the human form for the power to contract as the distinguishing difference between owners and owned. But this is a superficial and superstitious view,—one which ignores essential reason. When it has been discarded, as sooner or later it will be, no spook will remain to deter affectionate mothers from demanding satisfaction of their instinctive desire for absolute control of their babies, and this extremely large class will eagerly join the defensive association which secures them in such control. And later such an association would find strong friends, too, in those persons who would reflect with satisfaction that it secured them in their infancy the kind care of loving mothers and prevented meddlesome persons from separating them from their mothers because of the fancied cruelty of some perfectly innocent act or some necessary and beneficent measure of discipline. Mr. Byington views only the dark side of the picture. An impartial view of both sides indicates that he is seriously mistaken in his estimate of the comparative loss and gain in membership which an inclusive association would experience.

I think there is some force in the contention that protection of property right in a child whose owner had succeeded in so absolutely shutting it off from human association that not the smallest social conception could ever enter its mind would in a slight degree add to the total of possible invasive forces. But I am sure that such cases would be very rare; and, if I am fishing with a net the size of whose meshes is best adapted for general reasons to the catching of the largest number of fish, I cannot consent to make the meshes smaller simply because now and then a minnow escapes. The question of relative values comes in here. Mr. Byington well knows that I do not consider this a perfect world, or one that can be made perfect. I doubt the possibility of discovering any means of combating invasion that would not be open to the objection that, *because of it*, invasion, in some special direction and under unusual circumstances, might increase. True, I should expect such exceptional cases to ultimately succumb to influences other and more powerful than physical force. But precisely to such influences would I look to meet the evil of wilful isolation of children. Improved social conditions and a more general diffusion of education will do much; and then, Mr. Byington, there is your beloved boycott. Even I, who love it less, perhaps would use it with you here.

(6) If the plumb-line policy, as I claim, will attract a membership practically complete, why should I adopt a compromise policy as an attraction? If the desire for self-liberty, as I claim, is sufficient to prompt effective combination for defence, what need to strengthen it by sympathy, especially if thereby self-liberty is to be impaired? Why add fuel to the fire of loyalty to an association which is expected to succeed, not in proportion to the loyalty of its members, but in proportion to their readiness to secede at the slightest evidence of departure from the original programme? Again I tell you, Mr. Byington, that your puritanism is at the bottom of your trouble. You persist in looking upon this self-defensive union as if it were a crusade.

And why should I submit affectionate mothers to the outrages of absurd persons who fancy that they have proved these mothers cruel? How can I ask these mothers to help in protecting my title to the dollars which I have

earned by work that was perhaps a pleasure, if I refuse to help in protecting their even more indisputable title to property which they have obtained by a descent into the valley of the shadow? In this connection let me return for a moment to my conversation with the Anarchistic father to whom I have already alluded. He told me that once, when making a trip with his family, he was carrying his baby in a way which was not harmful to it and which he knew that it liked. Suddenly he noticed at a little distance a man apparently laboring under great and growing excitement, and endeavoring with some success to make passers-by share his agitation. Presently the father realized that all eyes were angrily centred upon himself,—a mystery which he did not understand until the instigator of these busybodies shouted at him in the authoritarian voice of righteous wrath: "Hold that baby straight!" Now, from that command to physical assault it is but a short step. Yet Mr. Byington, in effect, suggests that I quietly stand by and see such a father assaulted by a pack of sympathetic fools!

It is perhaps the strongest point in favor of such an association as I advocate that, instead of "undertaking unnecessarily difficult and perplexing duties," it confines itself to the simplest functions. A defensive association would not gain in simplicity by undertaking to do the numerous things that a faction may favor instead of the few things that nearly all can be induced to agree to. As for the particular duty of "drawing the line between infants and social units," it would prove one of the simplest. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that such a question would very rarely, perhaps never, necessitate a trial. The proof is found in the claim itself. Any child capable of declaring to the association's officers its desire for release from its owner that it may thereafter either care for itself or entrust itself to the care of persons more agreeable to it thereby proves the presence in its mind of the idea of contract. The child who can say, no matter in what childish language: "I wish to leave A and go with B, and, if B is good to me, I will be good to B," has become conscious of the existence of other people and of the necessity of dealing with them. From the moment that a child makes a deliberate declaration of this character it should cease to be property and should pass into the category of owners. Would the registration and recognition of such claims be a very perplexing task? It is my opinion that not a few children would be able to emancipate themselves, should they so desire, at the age of three years, and that very few indeed would be unable to do so at the age of five. But it is on children who have passed these ages that the grosser forms of cruelty are oftenest practised.

Equally simple is the question of ownership of the products of the child's labor. My statement of the object of the contract would have been more complete if I had worded it as follows: "to secure the contracting parties in the control of their persons and of the results of efforts made by them after becoming capable of contract." If asked to pass upon the case first cited by Mr. Byington, I should decide that the jewel belonged to the party owning the child at the time that the child found the jewel. In commenting upon the second, I must express my admiration for the judicial faculty which enables Mr. Byington to decide in favor of the man, and my regret that he has so little confidence in my own judicial faculty as to entertain the least suspicion that I would decide otherwise. At the same time I admit that in the case cited (which is another of those rare and abnormal cases in which Mr. Byington's imagination revels) the woman is in a painful plight. But painful plights not infrequently arise from many other manifestations of the property institution. If the case had been a little different; if the mother had borne her child after her emancipation, and had thereby become its owner; if this child had been suffering from a dangerous disease, only to be cured at great expense by a journey to the antipodes; and if the mother had been very poor and the father very rich,—still the father, by virtue of his ownership of his dollars, might, as before, have virtually compelled the mother to return to her slavery and sign away her future children as a condition of receiving the money wherewith to save her existing child from death. But such a case, painful as it would be, would hardly justify an abolition of property in dollars. I may add, however, that I would not favor the enforcement of any contract whereby a party, having once developed into an owner, should permanently deliver himself into the category of the owned.

(7 *b* and *c*) I would protect non-contracting adults on grounds of expediency: first, because it would be difficult for the criminally-inclined to distinguish between members and non-members, and therefore punishment of crimes against the latter would be likely to deter them from crimes against the former; and, second, because I believe that many of those disinclined to become members would, on experiencing great benefit from protection by the association, be impelled by gratitude and the spirit of fairness—by no means uncommon among criminals—to join in the contract. Certainly this last argument ought not to be without force to a follower of one who advised the turning of the other cheek. I am no Christian, no non-resistant; I believe in combating evil; I never turn the other cheek, but often repay my adversaries in kind and with interest: yet it is my sincere belief that a soft answer often turneth away wrath, and that the policy of meeting the criminal and non-social classes considerably more than half-way would prove as beneficial as it is humane. These reasons for protecting the classes named do not logically compel the exemption of babies from the property sphere.

I have still to answer Mr. Lloyd, whose letter also appears in this issue. But he must wait a little. Meanwhile let not the reader be alarmed as to Anarchism's future. It will endeavor to keep afloat a while yet, despite the gloomy forebodings of Sir Oracle regarding its approaching shipwreck. There's a smart breeze blowing, but this old craft has ridden stiffer gales before. T.

Four or five weeks ago another bond issue seemed imminent. One or two newspapers objected to this course, and thought that it would be better to call a special session of congress to meet the difficulty. The way in which this apparently innocent suggestion was received by the respectable
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They who in Glory's name were forward driven,
Unheeding Reason's voice; whose heed was given
To mandate rash of their exalted souls,
In haste to speed the tide that patient rolls,—
Undaunted they by the all-wide abyss
Still yawning 'twixt that better world and this,—
My thoughts are where these martyred heroes lie:
I hear their voice again, I see them die;
And thus my soul's restored to Hope and Time,
To all that's melancholy, yet sublime.

A. H. Jaeger.

The Defensive Contract.

To the Editor of Liberty:

We seem to be getting at the real reasons why babies must be owned, and the propositions of the argument seem to be these: (1) the policy of members of the defensive association must be ruled by "the desire for self-liberty," admitting motives of sympathy only in so far as they do not interfere with the fullest satisfaction of that desire; (2) the desire for self-liberty can be most fully satisfied by making the defensive association as effective as possible; (3) the defensive association will be most effective when most nearly all-embracing; (4) it is more important for this purpose, if we must choose, to have the membership of the unsympathetic, who naturally tend to crime, than to have that of those whose nature leads them to refrain from crime (Liberty, Oct. 5, p. 4, col. 1, top); (5) we shall get the fullest membership, and especially most of the criminal classes, by acknowledging as appropriable all the universe except those forces which can interfere with appropriation of the appropriable, "and whose liability to interfere can be lessened by admission to participation in the agreement," which "are [all] those, and only those, which are capable of understanding and entering into the agreement"; (6) therefore we should accept as members all who intelligently consent to join us, and protect them in their liberty to appropriate and use as they please all the appropriable universe, as defined, except what is already appropriated by others; (7) as to those who are not our members, but who do not come under the definition of the appropriable, (*a*) we need not protect them unless we see fit, (*b*) we may properly protect them if we do see fit ("Instead of a Book," p. 36), (*c*) we should not interfere with their liberty to dispose of appropriable objects at will.

Here are nine points, two of which (2 and 7*a*) are not objectionable either for intrinsic unsoundness or for inconsistency with the rest of the argument. The rest I ask leave to make some note on.

(1) Why? It cannot be maintained that one will do best always to make his own life, liberty, and property the supreme consideration in all matters. He may reasonably and properly risk any of them for the sake of sympathy, science, art, or anything else that deserves deep interest. Why should he not do this in the management of his defensive association as well as in his choice of a route of travel, making the protection to his liberty five per cent. weaker for the sake of giving his sympathies fifty per cent. fuller exercise? Because, you say, "if you make sympathy the soil, tyranny will be the ugly growth." Again, why? Motives of sympathy, guided by the knowledge that the happiness of those we sympathize with can be best secured by securing to them the fullest self-ownership compatible with the like self-ownership of others, are now leading us to work for liberty. When the ideas we are preparing come to be put in practice, why should not the same motives, guided by the same knowledge, lead our successors of that time to act in the same spirit as we now think and talk?

(3) I maintain that the association is likely to be weakened by trying to include two parties who aggressively and obstinately support incompatible views of the policy the association should follow; or persons whose circumstances make them especially likely to become the victims of crime, without correspondingly increasing their power to strengthen the association; or persons who may be expected to commit crime; or persons who are likely to make strong efforts to use the association for their own purposes at the expense of its serviceableness to the other members; or persons who, while able to understand a contract and willing to keep it, have no power to help in the common defence (instance, a man completely crippled in body and unpractical in mind, in a country so thinly settled as to offer no self-supporting employment to one who can neither work with his body or give wise counsel); or, doubtless, some other classes. I would protect some of these on grounds of sympathy, like babies, but without pretending that I was thereby strengthening the association, except as sympathy strengthens it. Others it may be impracticable to exclude without causing greater evils; but I think my list covers some who it would be both practicable and profitable to exclude, at least partially.

(4) As just suggested, I believe that such men, the association's natural enemies, will do less harm as outsiders than as members with a share in its management. Whether members or outsiders, they are probably restrained from crime against other members only by the fear of penalty, and this fear would be as strong for non-members as for members. Letting them be members might indeed give them to fear the additional penalty of expulsion, but your principles (3 and 4) would forbid the infliction of this penalty. And, besides being committers of crime, they would be elements of weakness and trouble as probable victims of crime, and still more so as likely to get into scrapes where the presence of crime would be clear, but whose crime it was would not,—making great expense for all who had to stick any finger in the pie. Certainly I think it extravagant to prefer such men to their opposites as members.

(5) That you may get more of the criminal classes this way I don't deny. That you will get more members I do deny. Establish an association that will protect children against brutal owners, and you expect to lose the membership of those who will not agree not to treat their children brutally. Establish an association which is not only to refuse to protect children, but even to resist and punish all who shall try to protect them, and don't you expect to lose the membership of any of those who want babies protected? Then the question is which class is larger, the shamelessly brutal or those whom you regard as needlessly and sentimentally compassionate? I should expect the latter class to be enough more numerous to compensate any possible advantages of a brutal membership—especially as the appropriability of babies will not be an attraction to all the brutal. Since you propose to let the mothers own the babies, no one will care for liberty to abuse babies except brutal women and men who would procure babies to be abused. The class (larger, I think) of brutal men who wouldn't put themselves to any great trouble or expense for the privilege of abusing a baby is not specially interested here. Further, if a child remembers that in the days of his helpless suffering the association stood back of his oppressor, warning off and repressing those who would have helped the victim, he is likely to grow up disaffected and to secede,—another loss of membership.

The identification of your two descriptions of the class to be recognized as self-owners is not complete. The helpless man supposed in my last example under (3) is "capable of understanding," etc., but he is not "a force liable to interfere." On the other hand, a person who has grown up from infancy without human company is not capable of understanding a contract without a little special education, but he is a force liable to interfere, and this liability can be lessened by that bit of education. If such a person falls into the hands of a master who is disposed to withhold this education, the association will diminish the amount of force liable to interfere with its members by making the first abuse of the master's power an excuse for terminating his mastership. The case is not an absurd one, for such persons are known to have existed by accident. Under your principles it would be lawful to produce them artificially, and motives would not be lacking; there are various purposes, such as concubinage and vivisection, for which it might, "to those who like that sort of thing," be convenient to possess an adult human being who could not claim or receive protection against any possible abuse. Such a one, by the way, will be a slave, even under Col. Greene's definition, as given in Liberty for September 21.

(6) All the above considerations tend to destroy the foundations of this conclusion; but even if the validity of all the points up to (6) be admitted, my first consideration, given under (5), suggests that your avowed object (the greatest possible membership) might perhaps be better attained by a compromise policy, refusing to punish brutal parents, but also refusing to protect in the possession of their children any who can be proved to be cruel.

Here follows something that should have come under (3). Besides the fact that some members bring more burden than strength, it is possible that a policy adopted for the purpose of attracting members may be so detrimental in other ways as to be worse than a loss of membership. There is more strength in a small number of loyal ones than in a larger number with many disaffected. Now, as I have said, it is to be expected that children whose sufferings have been increased by the association's policy will grow up disaffected. Again, even if sympathy is only a secondary motive, it strengthens the association; and a policy which lessens the influence of sympathy in firing the loyalty of the association's members, and in gaining the good-will of outsiders, weakens the association. Furthermore, to undertake unnecessarily difficult and perplexing duties is an element of weakness, and this trying to treat as property those who are afterward to become self-owners is going to make no end of trouble,—certainly in drawing the line between infants and social units, probably also now and then in regard to the ownership of products of the child's labor. A child who had not learned the meaning of contract might be made to pick up potatoes, and in so doing might pick up a jewel. If no use is made of the jewel till after the child declares his independence, who owns it,—the man who found it, or the man whose property found it? A woman such as described in my last illustration under (6) bears a child. Of course it belongs to her owner. Then she learns enough to emancipate herself. The man retains the child, and threatens to use a red-hot poker on it if she doesn't come back and submit to him as before, and sign a contract that the future children shall also be his. She claims the child and goes to law. She pleads: "Mr. Tucker says that the object of our contract is 'to secure the contracting parties in the control of their persons and of the results of their efforts.' I am now one of the contracting parties, and that child is the result of my efforts. —except, indeed, that I didn't act voluntarily in causing its existence; will that count against me? It is true that I brought it forth before entering into the contract, but no one ever contended that this principle applied only to the results of efforts made while in the contract. Although I did not then, and do now, know how to secure my liberty, I am as conscious of being the same woman who brought forth that child as any mother in this jury; and, if any of you can show a better title to her child than mine, I want her to state it." The man answers: "When that child was born, it was my property, according to our recognized principles, beyond dispute. As long as it is the same child and I am the same man, and neither it or I have done anything to alter our relation as owner and property, nothing that has happened to any third person can affect that relation." I should like to hear your decision as juryman. I, if I have to apply your principles, decide for the man but I should hate to have to refute the woman's arguments.

(7 *b* and *c*) I cannot reconcile these with your preceding argument. All your points in favor of treating babies as property apply equally to all who haven't entered the contract. You seem to advocate treating non-contracting adults respectfully as a sort of invitation to enter the contract; but I don't understand that. To tell a man that we will be just as careful of his self-liberty if he doesn't join us as if he does, how is that an appeal to join us on the ground of a desire for self-liberty? If the desire for self-liberty is made as strong a motive as possible for joining us, the advantage thereto from doing so and the disadvantage from not doing so ought to be made as notable as possible. If we expected him to act from sympathy, or any form of good-will, I should see the use of a conciliatory policy; yet even then the reasons which make it so imperative not to allow babies any protection ought at least to make it equally imperative that we never give active protection to any one outside our contract. We thereby lessen the

liberty of our unsympathetic members without getting any compensating advantage that is not likewise to be had by protecting babies.

STEPHEN T. BYINGTON.

Anarchist or Free Socialist?

As Mr. Tucker seems to feel that his opponents on this child question are inclined to be too hard upon him personally, I want to state at the outset that I know Mr. Tucker to be a generous friend and believe him to be a humane man. All the more strongly do I oppose him on this account, because I believe his doctrine would cause many to regard him as inhuman, and at any rate would be used by the inhuman as a justification for their inhumanity. Knowing Mr. Tucker's almost superstitious reverence for logic, I do not wonder that he accepts all the logical corollaries of his position, but I am as surprised as any of his critics to find that, once comprehending them, he does not abandon a position whose logical corollaries are so revolting. And I confess that his arguments appear to me strange, desperate, and reactionary. Without the least excitement I must say that his position on this question, if adhered to, will strike the death-blow to philosophical Anarchism. It is suicidal. Modern civilization will never accept it.

In the beginning of his reply to me he brings in Archist mothers. "We are discussing the question," he says, "not of what an Anarchist has a right to do, but of what a mother has a right to do." What of it? The question is the same. Natural rights are not changed by names. If in the nature of things it is wrong for one man to invade another, the invader acquires no indulgence by taking the name of Archist. My contention is that right and wrong are scientific facts, and our opinion about the inexpediency or expediency of a given course decides nothing but our own action. Of course the real expediency agrees with the real right. What the real right is can only be found, like any other scientific fact, by observation and experiment. It would appear that the human race had observed and experimented quite enough on this matter of invasion, and I had always supposed that Anarchists, at least, were satisfied that the invasion of one human being by another was in the highest degree wrong, foolish, dangerous, and inexpedient,—that this *was* Anarchism, and this only. It would appear that all these years I have been laboring under a great mistake,—teaching a false doctrine,—and I am now assured by the chief apostle of Anarchism that he "might, if it were necessary, disprove here, in a direct manner, the proposition that an Anarchist has no right to invade any individual."

Very cleverly, by ingeniously restating my position in his own words, he tries to bring me under the *régime* of contract, but I will none of it. He is like the famous quack who could cure only fits. If he can give me these contract fits, he can cure me of my rebellion. But I *fit* to no contract.

He says: "While basing his own duty in this respect upon his own view of expediency, he cannot refuse to allow others to make their opposite views of expediency the basis of a right to invade." But I do. Certainly in a narrow and proximate sense a man has a right to do what he *thinks* right because he can do no other. But all the same, if in his ignorance he is doing that which produces unhappiness, he is doing wrong, and nature proves him wrong by turning the consequences against him. He is not in harmony with Natural Right, and any one invaded by his ignorant action has a right to restrain it. But it must be observed that I do not base my "duty," in the true sense, upon my "own view." I base my action upon my own view, as others do, but my real duty and my real expediency are found in accordance with the natural right. And I must remark, as we go, that I have never yet acknowledged that might was right.

So I am not under the *régime* of contract.

Let us look into contract for a moment. A man may contract to be my slave for life. But Natural Right declares every man free and a self-owner from his birth. Therefore this contract can be enforced only by the man who makes it. The instant he takes back his liberty he is free. I have no right to enforce and can delegate to no one the right to enforce the contract upon him. No contract against liberty has any value whatever.

It is the same with a woman who promises to love, honor, and obey. All these promises are empty, except as she voluntarily fulfils them.

True Society is founded, then, not upon contract, but upon the natural fact that it can only exist where the right of each member to life, liberty, and the enjoyment of the fruit of his inoffensive efforts is acknowledged and defended by all.

Very weak are Mr. Tucker's attempts to make fun of my cripple exemplar. My statement was founded upon the old definition that a man may do as he pleases at his own expense. When the cripple lives at my expense, I have a right to direct that expense. If my expense produces apples and oranges, *because* I produce the food, and he does not, I have a right to tell him to eat apples and leave the oranges alone. It is a free gift, and a free gift takes any form the giver pleases. If he can dictate to me the form of my gift, he becomes a tax-gatherer and a master, and I become his subject and slave. Therefore, *because* I feed him, I may direct what he shall eat, and, *because* I clothe him, I may direct what he shall wear. When he gets food and garments elsewhere, I have no jurisdiction.

Equally weak is he when he comes to calves and babies. Certainly the stock-breeder who forces dependent life upon a calf is an invader (from the bovine standpoint) if he refuses support to it. Who denies it? But human equal liberty begins and ends with human beings and cannot be extended to non-human animals. Yes, the parent owes support to the child, but it is not true that the child owes nothing in return. As a member of free society the child owes respect for the parent's liberty. The parent owes support, but the *form* of that support is a matter of rightful parental choice. Whether the child shall have woman's milk, cow's milk, or goat's milk, graham bread or white, silk skirts or cotton ones, is for the parent, not the child, to decide.

Where is the "flagrant contradiction"?

Where is the "mental suicide"?

"Slavery in Anarchy an absurdity!" cries Mr. Tucker. ". . . Slavery in Anarchy, instead of an absurdity, is a necessity." That I should live to hear it!—and from my chief leader and teacher! "Will not the animals be slaves under Anarchy? Wherein does the undeveloped child differ from the animals? In its possibilities, does Mr. Lloyd answer? But the ovum in a woman's body has the same possibilities. Is it not her property?"

I had thought to make a passionate, satirical answer to all this. I had thought to assert that Anarchy began and ended with the human; that the animals could indeed be slaves *under* Anarchy, but not *in* it. I had thought to assert that no two terms could possibly be more antithetical than Slavery and Anarchy, and to inquire: "If the man who utters these two propositions in the same breath is not a mental suicide, what is he?"

But the scorn dies on my lips. What do I know about Anarchy! I am standing on my head, and my sun rises in the west and sets in the east. Mr. Tucker certainly knows Anarchy, and an Anarchist has a right to invade, and Slavery is a *necessity* in Anarchy,—the slavery of babes and fools, the meanest and most cowardly of all!

The undeveloped child differs from the animals in that it is *human*. Is that a "ghost," a "fetish," a superstition? So be it! I am not afraid of names. It is enough for me to know that you and I, Mr. Tucker, would never be safe in any society which did not hold the life and liberty of every human being sacred.

The ovum in the woman's body is her property. It has not the possibilities of the child. It is not a human being. When the germ of the woman and the sperm of the man have commingled and developed under certain conditions, then they have the possibilities of the child; then they become human. The precise point at which humanity commences is for physiologists to determine. I doubt if any one could say at present. Evolutionary embryologists claim that all the stages of evolution are passed by the embryo in utero in rapid review, as it were. Probably during this time the embryo is a mere brute in nature as in form. As a working rule, perhaps, it might be decided that the fœtus became human when the eye could decide it to be such by the form, or at quickening. But this is of little consequence. Border lines are always vague. What I am jealous to establish is the principle that, where humanity exists, it is to be sacredly respected and defended against invasion. Mr. Tucker makes the point "that no Anarchist will deny a mother's right to commit suicide during pregnancy." Perhaps; but I, who am now no Anarchist, do deny it *after the embryo becomes a human being*. The mother has a right to kill herself, but no one else.

And now we come to the doctrine of property. My property is mine, I said, always mine until voluntarily relinquished. Mr. Tucker meets this with the counter statement that property can outgrow its condition, and cites the evoluted monkey. Of course I am speaking ethically and not legally. The law makes and unmakes as it pleases according to *its* right of might. I am discussing fundamental right.

If I have a jack-knife, it is mine until my property right is voluntarily relinquished. No one has a right to force me to exchange it for anything else. If I lend it to a man, or he steals it, it is still mine, and I can recover it wherever I find it. I cannot be forced to accept a substitute. But, if this man drops it into the sea, he cannot recover or restore it, and I may not demand an impossibility, but I may justly demand compensation. So it is when my monkey becomes man. If the monkey was ever mine, he is forever mine. But, when evolution occurs, what then? My monkey is gone, but a man who has devoured, absorbed, assimilated my monkey remains. I have no property right in the man, but, as he has taken my monkey and cannot restore my monkey, he must pay me for the monkey, and so will my property right and his liberty both be vindicated.

Apply this to the child. If this human being is my property by real right, then I can hold him forever. No association has a shadow of a right to set up some arbitrary talk about "contract," to which I am no party, and take him from me. Nor can I be forced to take any substitute or compensation in place of him. I can demand *him* wherever I find him and hold *him* forever, for life or death, for mercy or for cruelty.

Again I reaffirm: "My child, if my property, is not only my slave now, but my slave for life; and not only my slave for life, but may be sold to another to be his slave, or may be willed to heirs and assigns. This doctrine, carried out logically, poisons Anarchism to its fountain-head, and reaffirms government in its intensest and most detestable form."

In my category of the owners and the owned I state it thus: Each human being owns himself = No human being owns another.

And now to make an end. As I have clearly been mistaken as to what constitutes Anarchism; as Mr. Tucker is the accredited head of that philosophy; and as he now assures the world in no uncertain tone that contract is its only basis, that an Anarchist has a right to invade, that might is the measure of right everywhere and always, that slavery in Anarchy is a necessity and children, fools, and non-contracting individuals the fit subjects of such slavery, that it is the duty of Anarchistic juries to effectually restrain those who attempt to defend children against parental cruelty, even to the finding a man guilty of murder in the first degree who should kill a parent to save a child,—in view of all this, and much more, I now wish to state with equal emphasis that henceforth I will have none of it.

Henceforth I am no Anarchist, but a Free Socialist!

This does not mean any change of views, or any loss of friendship for Mr. Tucker, or any appeal to any one to adhere to me in my defection.

But I wish to understand myself and be understood.

J. WM. LLOYD.

More Facts for Mr. Bliss.

To the Editor of Liberty:

In response to your request for facts tending to show the disadvantages of municipal conduct of public works, I, as a native of "the best-governed city in the world," according to Julian Ralph, can give you plenty, and I have written to the editor of Glasgow "Single Tax;" who complains of the municipal conduct of the tramways there, to tell you his reasons. In the first place, the Birmingham corporation, having purchased the gas works, does all it can to discourage the electric light, which consequently is hardly seen there at all. It carried out the piercing of a new thoroughfare ostensibly to provide model dwellings

for workingmen, but hitherto it has caused nothing to be erected but business premises; and indeed the half of the new street that was to go through the slum region has not been begun, although it is twenty years since the plans were made. It has paved the principal business streets with granite, although in other towns this is being discarded for wood. Steam tramways are laid all over the city, though no private company would have been allowed to have such ugly and dangerous motors.

EVACUSTES A. PHIPSON.

SELLY OAK, BIRMINGHAM, ENGLAND.

Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps.

The Secretary wants every reader of Liberty to send in his name for enrolment. Those who do so thereby pledge themselves to write, when possible, a letter every fortnight, on Anarchism or kindred subjects, to the "target" assigned in Liberty for that fortnight, and to notify the secretary promptly in case of any failure to write to a target (which it is hoped will not often occur), or in case of temporary or permanent withdrawal from the work of the Corps. All, whether members or not, are asked to lose no opportunity of informing the secretary of suitable targets. Address, STEPHEN T. BYINGTON, Flushing Institute, Flushing, N. Y.

The Provincetown "Advocate" was made a target for Section B on September 17. It is said that up to October 19 no letters from that section had been received. I do not think any members of that section have reported to me a failure to attack that target. What is the matter?

Target, section A.—The Boston "Herald," on October 10, gave a two-and-a-half-column report of a lecture before the Twentieth Century Club on "Anarchy or Government in Industry," by Mr. Salter of Philadelphia, in which he explains the meaning of Anarchy very clearly and correctly, explains what he means by "industrial Anarchy," and then argues as follows:

The justification of government for the protection of life and property is only that on the whole, in average existing circumstances, it meets the ends of social existence better than liberty or Anarchy does—not that under other circumstances Anarchy might not do as well or better. The only real question about Anarchy in the industrial realm is: how does it work?

He then shows by the Pullman strike that our present industrial system, which he throughout describes as Anarchistic, works badly. Therefore he favors government regulation of industries. Point out that our system of government for police purposes is not founded on any experience of its superiority to an Anarchistic police system, and that we certainly have not, and have not had, Anarchy in the industrial sphere.

Section B.—Dr. S. D. Woods, Connellsville, Pa., delivered an address in August before a conference for union of reform parties, in which he took the ground that the money issue is the fundamental one; that it is the government's stamp, making it legal tender, that makes money; that gold is able to collect tribute from the workers because gold alone is legal tender for *all* debts; that the government should issue money directly to all citizens who can furnish proper security. Show him the practical advantages of free money.

STEPHEN T. BYINGTON.



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